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Abstract 
This paper examines the extent to which aid disbursement delays could be used as an indicator of the aid 
unpredictability and absorptive capacity in recipient countries. Since many recipient countries are dependent on aid, 
disbursement delays might matter for its effectiveness. The emphasis is put on the so-called pipeline approach, 
according to which, in the short run, disbursement constraints may lead to huge delays and weak rates of aid 
disbursement relative to commitments. After the literature review on disbursement delays, we use the framework of 
programmable aid to run some econometric estimations through a dynamic model, an ARDL, for a panel of 48 African 
countries during the period of 1975–2008. We find disbursement constraints mainly at the short-run level, while the 
main donor's specific factors seem to be the selectivity and the degree of aid fragmentation. Disbursement rates and 
rhythms are also influenced by the economic performance and governance quality of the recipient countries and the 
share of grants in aid modalities. Bilateral donors are found to under-perform in comparison with multilateral donors in 
terms of the rhythm of aid disbursement. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
During  previous  decades,  the  analysis  of  foreign  aid  effectiveness  mainly  focused  on  its 
ability to promote sustainable growth. Recently, however, the aid literature debate has tended 
to  emphasize  its  performance  in  terms  of  alleviating  the  growing  poverty  in  developing 
countries. To some extent, this shift in the debate was influenced by the commitments made 
in  the  framework  of  the  Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDGs).  Then  the  absorptive 
capacity issues came naturally to the front of the aid effectiveness debate. Indeed, even in the 
case of full respect of  a donor’s commitment to provide more  aid, the crucial issue may 
remain the ability of recipient countries to absorb these amounts of aid more usefully. While 
some authors, such as Easterly (2005) and Rajan and Subramanian (2011), are sceptical about 
the  need  to  scale  up  aid  due  to  absorptive  capacity  problems,  others  authors,  like  Sachs 
(2005), are keen proponents of a substantial increase in aid in order to reach the MDGs. 
Poverty trap arguments are usually put forward to claim the need to increase the amount of 
aid for poor countries, but these arguments are not sufficient to convince donors to make more 
commitments and to respect them by disbursing more effective aid. A consensus seems to 
emerge from academic and practitioner fields that absorptive capacity issues are one of the 
determinants of  foreign  aid effectiveness.  This paper  focuses on aid disbursement delays, 
which constitute one of the four approaches of the absorptive capacity literature.  
 
Indeed, the three other approaches to absorptive capacity concern firstly the macroeconomic 
unrest – Dutch disease approach – resulting from aid increase and instability, leading to the 
loss of economic competitiveness in receiving countries.
1 The second approach points out the 
problem of diminishing marginal returns of aid by using threshold principles, while the third 
approach  pays  attention  to  the  effects  of  aid  on  the  recipient  country’s  institutional 
weaknesses.
2 Yet, the disbursement delays approach has been neglected by academic works, 
which is surprising if we consider the interest of aid practitioners in this issue. This research 
aims at remedying this gap by proposing theoretical and empirical frameworks to analyse aid 
delays. The disbursement delays approach is also called the “pipeline approach” to absorptive 
capacity in reference to the stock of aid waiting for the disbursement process, or otherwise the 
lags between commitments and disbursements. While considering the rate and the rhythm 
associated with these disbursements we can reasonably assume that the size of the aid pipeline 
reflects the importance of the bottlenecks affecting the adequate timing of disbursements, so it 
provides  useful  indications  of  the  absorptive  capacity  of  a  given  receiving  country.  The 
potential  unpredictability  resulting  from  aid  delays  affects  negatively  the  economic 
performance of the receiving country by decreasing the aid impact on growth and by affecting 
the  recipient  government’s  incitements  to  undertake  huge  public  investments  to  reduce 
poverty (Lensink and Morrissey, 2000; Bulíř and Lane, 2002; Arellano et al, 2009; Agénor 
and  Aizenman,  2010).  However,  some  mitigating  effects  should  be  considered  while 
assuming that recipient governments are in the habit of facing foreign aid unpredictability and 
uncertainty. The small amount of literature on aid delays does not present uniform views 
about the relevance and size of lags in disbursements as much as about the potential factors 
explaining these delays.
3 In such a context, we propose firstly in this paper a brief review of 
the debate on the origins and sizes of aid delays by making a distinction between the causes 
                                                 
1 See Berg et al (2005); Heller (2005); Rajan and Subramanian (2011). 
2 See Knack (2001); Clemens et al (2003, 2004); Guillaumont and Lajaaj (2006); Birdsall (2007); Bowman and Chand 
(2007); Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney (2007); Knack and Rahman (2007). 
3 See Kanbur (2000); Bulíř and Hamann (2001, 2003, 2006); Bulíř and Lane (2002); Odedokun (2003); Eifert and Gelb 
(2005); Leurs (2005); Vargas Hill (2005); Svenson (2006); Celasun and Walliser (2008); Deutscher and Fyson (2008); 
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coming from the recipients and those attached to donors’ behaviours, and without neglecting 
the causes related to aid modalities. In a second step, we shed light on the potential empirical 
determinants of aid delays for 48 countries in Africa, during the period 1975–2008, by using 
an econometric approach through a dynamic panel data model and adopting the framework of 
programmable aid which take into account the amount of aid arriving effectively in recipient 
countries. The ARDL model, which allows us to differentiate between short- and long-run 
effects of disbursement constraints, is thus run. Disbursement constraints are found mainly at 
the short-run level, while the main donor-specific factors seem to be the selectivity and the 
degree of aid fragmentation. The disbursement rates and rhythms are also influenced by the 
economic performance and the governance quality of the recipient countries and the share of 
grants  in  aid  modalities.  Bilateral  donors  are  found  to  under-perform  in  comparison  with 
multilateral donors in terms of the rhythm of aid disbursement.  
 
 
2.  The origins of gaps between commitments and disbursements 
  
Studying the absorptive capacity through the pipeline approach is motivated by the fact that it 
allows the understanding and assessment of the short-run constraints of absorptive capacity. 
Previous approaches to absorptive capacity were in some ways unsatisfactory because they 
described and  captured  essentially the long-run  constraints on  aid disbursements. The aid 
pipeline represents the amount of aid pledged by donors but not yet disbursed. This waiting 
stock of aid is often postponed or simply cancelled. So, the level of the pipeline is influenced 
by the importance of the bottlenecks and constraints that the disbursement process has to 
support. Also, the pipeline level might be a good indicator of the capacity of a given recipient 
country to absorb usefully a more important quantity of foreign aid flows. Yet, the magnitude 
of  the  disbursement  lags  will  depend  on  the  frame  adopted  to  notify  the  dates  of  new 
disbursements  in  reference  to  the  commitment  dates.  Because  donors  and  recipients 
sometimes  use  different  definitions  of  disbursement  dates,  there  is  some  confusion  about 
disbursement delays measures that makes temporal and cross-country comparisons difficult. 
 
The invisible bureaucratic pipeline of aid runs in a circuit from the donor to the recipient 
sides. Therefore, the time gap between the different levels of this pipeline might be relatively 
long depending on the stage of the aid cycle facing bottlenecks. Indeed, among the three 
stages of the aid cycle (feasibility studies, negotiation and execution), only the last stage is 
considered in this paper. It is important for the recipient country to deal with a regular and 
predictable rhythm of disbursements, which is crucial for budget planning, credibility in terms 
of public investment and avoiding the diminishing utility and time inconsistency problem in 
public resource allocations. More importantly, there is a real need to identify and explain the 
factors that are at the origin of long disbursement delays. However, in the academic literature, 
there  is  no  consensus  about  the  nature  and  net  consequences  of  constraints  affecting  aid 
disbursements. Indeed, some authors such as Kanbur (2000) and Svensson (2006) support the 
idea that there are inadequate quick disbursements of aid because donors are under the spell of 
pressures or are victims of the Samaritan dilemma, while other authors
4 denounce the slow 
rhythm and long delays in aid disbursements. Before exposing the argumentations of each of 
these two groups, let us note that in both cases it is the aid effectiveness that is threatened. 
                                                 
4 Bulíř and Lane (2002); Odedokun (2003); Leurs (2005); Bulíř and Hamann (2006); Roodman (2006); Celasun and Walliser (2008); 
Deutscher and Fyson (2008); OECD-DAC (2008). For instance Bulir and Hamann (2001, 2003) and Celasun and Walliser (2008) found that 
the predictive power of the IMF’s aid commitment in terms of disbursement is on average between 70% and 80% in Africa Odedokun (2003) 
has shown that the rate of disbursement of the aid provided by OECD/DAC bilateral donors is influenced by donor economic and political 
characteristics (economic growth, budget, political polarization …) and by aid modalities such the tying degree and the proportion of grants. 
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Indeed, the risks associated with quick disbursements are important and concern for instance 
the  wasting  of  aid  and  the  promotion  of  bad  governance.  On  the  other  side,  slow 
disbursements can have the undesirable effects mentioned above by generating uncertainty 
about  the  disbursement  rhythm  or  by  subsequently  reducing  the  global  volume  of  aid 
available due to potential cancellations resulting from long delays. 
 
2.1.  Arguments supporting the existence of speedy disbursements 
 
Part of the aid literature postulates that the current rhythm of aid disbursement is excessively 
high, contrary to the view of some authors. For authors defending this fact, aid agencies are 
likely  to  face  pressures  in  different  forms,  in  order  to  disburse  aid  quickly  even  if  the 
conditionalities are not satisfied. The nature of pressures for disbursements depends on the 
type of aid agency – multilateral or bilateral – and on the modalities of aid – loan or grant. For 
multilateral agencies, the pressures could come from the main contributors to these agencies, 
namely the rich developed countries. Indeed, multilateral aid allocation is often influenced by 
political  factors  coming  from  developed  countries,  so  that  disbursements  could  also  be 
influenced by these same factors. Bureaucratic considerations and interests in aid agencies are 
also likely to lead to quick disbursements because it is usual to base the determination of the 
size  of  new  commitments  on  aid  agencies’  performance  in  terms  of  the  rate  of  previous 
disbursements (Kanbur, 2000; Svensson, 2006). On the other hand, bilateral aid agencies are 
not immune to pressures. As multilateral donors, bilateral agencies could also be confronted 
with bureaucratic interests and constraints (bounds of the fiscal year) that could encourage 
quick disbursements. In addition, bilateral donors generally pursue multiple objectives among 
which  political  and  trade  considerations  (for  instance  the  motives  for  tying  aid)  tend  to 
contribute to the acceleration in the rhythm of  disbursements (Boone,  1996; Celasun and 
Walliser, 2006, 2008; Villanger, 2006; Amegashie et al, 2007). Nonetheless, both bilateral 
and multilateral aid agencies are affected by the Samaritan dilemma, which refers to their 
incapacity to make a credible commitment aiming to punish bad performances of receiving 
countries.  Besides,  there  is  asymmetric  information  in  the  relation  between  receiving 
countries,  donors  and  developed  countries’  citizens  contributing  to  the  aid.  This  classical 




2.2.   Arguments supporting the existence of long disbursement delays
6 
 
2.2.1.  Donor-specific factors 
    
Donors’ fragmentation and the slowness related to multiple procedures: Aid fragmentation 
concerns the number of donors in a recipient country as well as the proliferation of activities 
financed by donors leading to a high transaction cost for the recipient country. Moreover, 
bureaucratic slowness in the donor’s country as well as calendar and priority discrepancies 
                                                 
5 Leandro et al (1999); Easterly (2000); Svensson (2000, 2003); Pedersen (2001); Svensson (2003); Adam et al (2004); Hagen (2006); 
Miquel-Florensa (2007).  
6 In 2005, the SPA – Strategic Partnership with Africa –published a report (SPA, 2005) to present the results of its surveys undertaken in 15 
African states during 2003 and 2004. It found that on average 81% of the aid commitments made in 2003 were disbursed in the same year, 
while 10% were disbursed in 2004 and 9% were cancelled. The report noted that donors estimate at 40% the proportion of cases due to the 
non-fulfilment of conditionalities and 29% related to administrative issues on the donor side, while 25% concerned the slowness in the 
procedural  conditions  to  be  respected  by  the  recipient.  Only  4%  were  due  to  political  problems  in  the  donor  country.  Bilateral  and 
multilateral donors differ because 60% of the delays for multilateral aid are due to non-satisfaction of conditionality while this cause 
represents only 35% for bilateral aid. The first cause of delays in bilateral aid (40% of cases) is the administrative problems in the donor 
country while recipient non-fulfilment of procedural conditions is the second cause of multilateral aid delays (25% of cases). 4 
 
lead to long delays in aid disbursement. In light of these situations, the Paris Declaration in 
2005 recognized that donor coordination is one of the key issues of aid effectiveness. 
Aid allocation is often made on a political basis: As commitments are influenced by political 
factors intervening in donor country as well as in recipient country, it is not surprising that 
disbursements  are  also  likely  to  be  under  these  influences.  This  issue  seems  to  concern 
bilateral aid more than multilateral aid.
7  Indeed, some donors are inclined to make more 
commitments  just  to  manage  strategically  some  geopolitical  contexts,  but  as  soon  as  the 
international  situation  or  the  internal  political  context  change,  these  previous  aid 
commitments  are  unlikely  to  be  converted  into  disbursements.  However  this  concerns 
essentially the strategic components of each donor’s global aid. Most of bilateral donors use 
different national channels or agencies to manage their aid policies, for instance in USA we 
have the USAID, the MCC, the Department of State and the Department of Defense, while in 
France we can note the French Agency for Development (AFD) and the Ministry of foreign 
affairs. Then, domestic political changes do not affect equally the share of aid channeled 
through each agency. In turn, multilateral aid is also likely to be influenced by these political 
factors  as  bilateral  donors  could  change  the  share  of  theirs  funds  transiting  through 
multilateral  channels.  Yet,  the  culture  of  political  neutrality  prevailing  in  multilateral 
organizations might reduce their sensitivity to political events in recipient country. Therefore 
the gap between commitments and disbursements should be lower for multilateral aid (so high 
disbursement rhythm is potentially expected). 
 
Aid  conditionality  problem:  Conditionality  is  technology  seeking  to  solve  the  problem  of   
asymmetric information and time inconsistency in the relation between donors and recipients. 
Recipients could be tempted to perform some kind of opportunism behaviour, as it is well 
known  that  aid  flows  can  be  fungible  and  donors  are  likely  to  be  under  the  Samaritan 
dilemma.
8 Thus, the non-fulfilment of political and economic conditionalities by the recipient 
leads  to  long  delays  and  cancellations  in  disbursements.  However,  it  can  occur  that  the 
recipient  satisfies  all  the  conditionality  rules  while  the  donor  is  unable  to  or  refuses  to 
disburse  the  amount  of  aid  pledged.  Yet,  the  current  tendency  is  to  move  from  input 
conditionality towards outcome/performance conditionality.  
  
2.2.2.  Recipient-specific factors 
 
Among the recipient-specific factors there is the bureaucratic slowness that, combined with 
multiple  procedures  for  financing  agreements  and  non-fulfilment  of  aid  conditionality, 
contributes  to  deepening  the  disbursement  delays.  In  many  recipient  countries,  the  public 
administration is not able to follow accurately all the procedures requested by donors and this 
situation  leads  to  disbursement  delays.  Aid  delays  often  occur  because  there  is  an 
overestimation of the recipient’s ability to provide its own contribution in terms of financial 
compensation in aid disbursement schemes and some difficulties remain related to public 
procurements and contractual enterprise failures during the execution stage of aid activities. 
Besides,  some  political  and  institutional  characteristics  of  recipients  could  matter  for  the 
disbursement  rhythm.  Indeed,  during  political  events  and  instability  (such  as  electoral 
periods), donors are generally more suspicious about the use of their financing, so that they 
slow down or stop disbursements. Moreover, some disbursement delays may result in the 
inadequacy or weakness of the structure of recipient country’s law and order. For instance if 
                                                 
7  Alesina  and  Dollar  (2000);  Collier  and  Dollar  (2002);  McGillivray  (2003);  Berthelemy  and  Tichit  (2004);  Isopi  and 
Mavrotas (2006). 
8 Burnside and Dollar (1997); Devarajan and Swaroop (1998); Svensson (2000); Pedersen (2001); Azam and Laffont (2003); 
Hagen (2006). 5 
 
aid is planned to finance local businesses, the administrative procedures delays will impact 
finally the rhythm of aid disbursement. The World Bank Doing Business project highlighted 
this issue by showing that the legal origin of law and the effectiveness of regulation matter the 
most  (World  Bank,  2009).  Beside  these  recipient-specific  factors  we  can  also  notify  the 
infrastructure bottlenecks as well as the issue of availability of skilled workforce and the 
structure of labour market in recipient countries. Depending on the nature of the  activity 
financed  by  aid,  the  weakness  of  the  physical  infrastructures  and  skilled  workforce  may 
increase disbursement delays. 
 
2.2.3.  Aid modalities matter 
 
As aid flows are not homogeneous one might conceive some discrepancies in disbursement 
constraints depending on the aid modalities. The aid financial modalities – loan or grant – are 
not expected to have similar disbursement constraints. Above all, loan disbursements may 
have relatively long delays in cases of highly indebted recipients, but on the other hand one 
might consider that delays in loan disbursements are low relative to grants. As grants could be 
assimilated to free resources by the recipient, donors are likely to be more cautious during 
their disbursement process. These theoretical contradictions can be elucidated by the fact that 
the comparison between aid financial modalities will depend on what the aid is assumed to 
finance  (Fielding  and  Mavrotas,  2005).  For  example,  when  grants  are  provided  through 
emergency aid, their delays might be weak comparative to loans that finance generally large 
projects. Delays in infrastructure projects must naturally be high relative to delays in social 
projects. In the same way, disbursement delays will depend on the channels through which the 
aid flows are provided. Budget and programme aid flows are not constrained in the same way 
as project aid flows. Therefore, differences in bilateral and multilateral donors’ behaviours in 
terms of disbursement delays could be explained by the discrepancies in terms of aid modality 
adoption, the differences in the activities financed by the  aid and the  differences in their 
sample of aid recipients. 
    
3.  An ARDL econometric analysis of disbursement constraints in Africa 
 
3.1.  Motives for using an ARDL model 
 
In this section we check empirically the limits of absorptive capacity following the pipeline 
approach by seizing the dynamism accompanying the influences of potential factors affecting 
aid disbursements. These identifications are made through a dynamic panel model, namely 
ARDL – Auto Regressive Distributed Lags, which allows us to deal simultaneously with the 
short-  and  long-run  dynamism  of  absorptive  capacity.  As  it  is  recognized  that  absorptive 
capacity is essentially a dynamic phenomenon,
9 it appears relevant to use an ARDL model, 
contrary to some authors who use a classical panel model (Ododekun, 2003) or AR model 
(Bulir  and  Hamann,  2001,  2003).  Indeed,  the  temporal  lags  between  commitment  and 
disbursement  are  likely  to  lead  to  a  co-integration  system  that  needs  an  error  correction 
model. This is necessary to capture the magnitude of the short-run disequilibrium between 
commitments and disbursements and finally to appraise the size of the adjustment speed of 
disbursements towards their long-run equilibrium conditioned by the aid pipeline. In practice, 
it consists of explaining the disbursement variations by current and previous commitments, 
previous disbursements, recipients’ and donors’ characteristics and aid modalities. The AR 
dimension of the model is supported by the assumption that previous disbursements can affect 
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current  disbursements.  This  assumption  is  related  to  the  properties  of  the  aid  pipeline 
according to which the amount of previous disbursements influences the current disbursement 
capacities. The DL dimension of the model is guided by the assumption according to which 
previous  commitments  influence  current  disbursements.  This  assumption  is  based  on  the 
principle of continuity for commitments that are generally distributed over time due to the 
donor’s  will  or  absorptive  capacity  constraints.  Therefore  the  combination  of  these  two 
dimensions deals explicitly with the aid pipeline generated by the lag between commitments 
and disbursements while correcting for the magnitude of uncertainty on disbursements.  
 
3.2.  Specification and estimation techniques 
 
The ARDL model is specified as: 
                                                                                                                             
             (a) 
 
where  , i t D   denotes  the  gross 
disbursements of ODA (official development aid) received by a recipient i (1,…, 48) during 
the period t (1, …, 34).  X  is the vector of explanatory variables. Equation (a) leads to an error 
correction model used for the estimations: 
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il β  are the coefficients of short-
run elasticities; and  i φ is the error correction coefficient and measures the adjustment speed of 
disbursements converging toward their long-run equilibrium while considering variations in 
commitments  or  other  factors  influencing  disbursements.  It  captures  the  effect  of  the  aid 
pipeline  on  disbursements  after  controlling  for  the  effects  of  other  factors.  The  model  is 
relevant if the estimated coefficient 
^
i φ is significant and negative. If the absolute value of this 
coefficient is near to zero, lower is the adjustment and it results in a weak convergence of 
disbursements. These two parameters are important for our analysis because the design and 
adoption of policy, against the harmful effects of aid instability and unpredictability, will 
depend on the temporal or permanent nature of aid flow variations. Thus, the error correction 
model  is  estimated  with  the  mean  group  (MG)  and  pool  mean  group  (PMG)  estimator 
methods developed by Pesaran et al (1999). MG allows individual heterogeneity in both the 
short and the long run, while PMG accepts heterogeneity in the short run but homogeneity of 
behaviours  in  the  long  run.  For  the  authors,  these  estimators  are  robust  to  the  issue  of 
endogeneity and to the occurrence of unit roots. 
3.3.  Data and variables 
The sample is composed of 48 African countries observed during the period 1975 to 2008. 
The aid data are from OECD/DAC statistics, but we apply the principle of programmable 
aid
10 in order to obtain the effective aid flow arriving in recipient countries. The dependent 
variable is the first difference of annual ODA disbursements in each recipient country. The 
explanatory variables are the first difference of previous and current ODA commitments and 
the  first  difference  of  previous  disbursements.  These  variables  are  in  log  format.  Other 
                                                 
10 To obtain programmable aid, we subtract from the global ODA flows the component of aid likely to be disbursed quickly 
in essence or to be used out of recipient countries, such as technical cooperation aid and emergency aid. 
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variables are the share of grants in the total ODA, the share of commitment going to 32 
African  LDCs  (least  developed  countries),  controlling  for  selectivity  issues,  and  aid 
fragmentation  index  (number  of  donors  having  a  weight  inferior  to  5%  in  each  recipient 
country). In order to control for the recipient governance quality we introduce the dummy 
Election (if the recipient country is in a pre-electoral or electoral period, see Keefer et al, 
2002).  Recipient  socio-economic  characteristics  (data  from  the  World  Bank/WDI)  are 
controlled by GDP per capita, while we use the rate of foreign direct investment – FDI/GDP 
(inflows) to capture the trade pressures on aid disbursements (tying degree of aid)
11. 
  
3.4.  Findings and implications 
 
Three main findings can be drawn from the econometric estimation (see Tables A.1 to A.3). 
First, we have found that absorptive capacity constraints matter essentially in the short run. 
The  second  important  result  is  that  recipients’  and  donors’  characteristics  also  affect 
disbursement delays. Finally, the third result is that aid modalities influence disbursement 
delays  too.  Rows  (1)  and  (2)  of  Table  A.1  suggest  firstly  that  there  are  disbursement 
constraints  essentially  in  the  short  run  since  the  short-run  elasticities  are  negative,  which 
means that marginal variations in commitments are not followed by marginal variations in 
disbursements.  However,  the  long-run  elasticity  shows  that  the  problem  of  absorptive 
capacity  disappears  over  time  and  the  disbursements  respond  positively  to  commitment 
variations (96% for the mean group estimator and 106% for the pool mean group estimator). 
This result supports the idea that the absorptive capacity is mainly a short-run issue, so the 
disbursement delays approach is likely to remain more relevant than other absorptive capacity 
approaches based on long-run assumptions. The second important finding concerns the speed 
of disbursements. The adjustment coefficient is not high enough either for MG (56% per year) 
or for PMG (46% per year). This coefficient characterizes the conditional evolution of the 
pipeline so that the disbursement delay properties are revealed. Moreover, the Hausman test 
for the choice between the MG and the PMG estimator concludes the relevance of the PMG 
estimator, which is then retained for all the other estimations. 
 
The  socio-economic  characteristics  of  the  recipients  play  some  important  roles  in 
disbursement structures only in the long run. Indeed, the effect of the FDI rate is positive 
(Table A.1), a result that could be supported by the fact that the private interests of foreign 
investors are likely to generate pressures for disbursements in the case of tied aid. Recipient 
countries’ institutional quality matters for delays as the dummy “Election” has a negative 
effect in the long run, which should denote the distrust of donors in the pre-electoral period, 
but in the short run, the effect could be neglected (Table A.1). Aid selectivity may also matter 
for disbursement dynamism. For instance, the aid targeting to 32 LDCs in Africa leads to 
negative effects on disbursements in the short run but the effects become positive in the long 
run with a weak speed of adjustment (Table A.2 and Table A.3 in column 3). This result may 
be explained by the fact that LDCs, with their structural vulnerability characteristics, meet 
some constraints to absorb more aid in the short run, but this handicap disappears in the long 
run. This result suggests that donors should take this fact into account while financing LDCs, 
and calls for adapting aid to factors likely to improve the absorptive capacity. Concerning the 
aid  fragmentation,  it  influences  disbursements  negatively  but  with  some  threshold  effects 
(Table A.2). This negative effect is due to some increases in transaction costs induced by aid 
fragmentation. On the other hand,  aid modalities are not to be neglected while analysing 
disbursement  delays  since  aid  flows  are  not  homogeneous.  For  example,  aid  financial 
                                                 
11 See Appendix B.1 and B.2 for descriptive statistics, data sources and the list of countries in the sample. 8 
 
modalities such as the share of grants in aid commitments affect disbursements positively in 
the long run and improve the disbursement speed (see Table A.2).   
Finally, Table A.3 presents some comparative results through various aid flows and sample 
specifications. For instance, the column (1) and (2) compare programmable aid to global aid. 
We can remark that the adjustment speed for programmable aid is inferior to the global aid 
one, which confirms our argument according to which using global aid flow may lead to 
underestimate  the  extent  of  disbursement  delays.  Indeed,  as  bilateral  donors  provide  an 
important part of their assistance in the form of non-programmable aid (food aid, emergency 
aid, debt forgiveness, technical assistance), we find a low disbursement speed for them. So, 
they may present high aid delays compared to multilateral donors when we use programmable 
aid (Table A.3). The main explanations of this result is that bilateral and multilateral donors 
do not have always the same composition of aid flows (the level of programmable aid for 
instance). Besides, they do not have the same aid modalities (grant or loan, project aid or 
budgetary  aid…),  the  same  sector  destination  of  aid  and  finally  the  same  donor’s  side 
constraints on disbursements. If we consider for instance aid financial modalities, bilateral 
donors provide mainly theirs funds in grants while multilateral aid is essentially provided in 
concessional loans. As grants could be considered by recipient government as free resources, 
the structure of conditions associated to its disbursements may reduce the rhythm and rate in 
comparison with commitments. Moreover, according to the “mood” of the bilateral donor’s 
government, we could assist to frequent “stop and go” in bilateral aid disbursements. This 
result shows in some extent that aid business as well as aid effectiveness should be conceived 
both  in  terms  of  donor’s  interest  and  recipient’s  needs  or  characteristics.  However,  even 
though  this  result  is  validated  empirically  when  we  compare  the  totality  of  bilateral  and 
multilateral programmable aid, some bilateral donors, taken individually, have low delays 
compared to some multilateral donors (for example France compared with the IDA-World 
Bank).    
  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
The  identification  of  the  most  problematic  factors  influencing  disbursement  delays  is 
important to the process of improving aid effectiveness. This is a step toward the adoption of 
strategies  to  cope  with  the  harmful  effects  of  foreign  financing  unpredictability.  This 
unpredictability  is  updated  with  the  current  financial  crisis  affecting  donors’  countries 
seriously. The paper has addressed a review of theoretical arguments explaining disbursement 
delays. It appears that the causes of delays are to be found both in recipients’ and in donors’ 
characteristics,  notably  their  politico-economic  characteristics.  Aid  modalities,  such  as 
selectivity in favour of vulnerable recipient countries and financial composition in terms of 
loans or grants, are not to be neglected. The econometric estimations support the existence of 
constraints  on  the  absorptive  capacity  essentially  in  the  short  run  while  revealing  some 
differences  between  bilateral  and  multilateral  donors.  Among  the  reasons  for  these 
discrepancies are differences in the aid modalities and motivations for each of these two kinds 
of donors. The results of this paper call for changes in donors’ practices, notably in the aid 
allocation  process,  which  should  take  into  account  recipients’  structural  characteristics, 
particularly  the  vulnerability  issues,  and  increase  the  share  of  grants  in  the  aid  budget. 
Ultimately,  dealing  with  aid  delays  and  uncertainty  needs  some  changes  in  recipients’ 
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Appendix A: Econometric results 
                
 
























                   Note:  Z- Statistics absolute values are in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 












Dependant variable: first difference of ODA disbursements received from all donors 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  MG  PMG  PMG  PMG  PMG  PMG 
Long run             
Commitment  0.956  1.062  0.976  1.002  1.016  1.017 
  (10.11)***  (42.78)***  (36.28)***  (42.09)***  (35.60)***  (46.90)*** 
GDP per capita      -0.329  -0.327    -0.340 
      (6.16)***  (6.31)***    (7.01)*** 
FDI rate        0.841    0.633 
        (3.25)***    (3.09)*** 
Election          -0.193  -0.134 
          (4.98)***  (4.34)*** 
             
Speed  of 
adjustment  
-0.566  -0.461  -0.452  -0.490  -0.447  -0.476 
  (16.44)***  (15.41)***  (9.17)***  (10.75)***  (16.20)***  (9.75)*** 
Short run             
∆Commitment  -0.097  -0.073  -0.112  -0.093  -0.054  -0.095 
  (2.51)**  (2.25)**  (2.32)**  (2.32)**  (1.63)  (2.12)** 
∆Disbursement lag1  -0.048  -0.084  -0.103  -0.068  -0.100  -0.085 
  (1.77)*  (2.69)***  (2.99)***  (1.86)*  (2.98)***  (2.20)** 
∆Commitment lag1  -0.030  -0.022  -0.015  -0.047  -0.005  -0.039 
  (0.99)  (0.94)  (0.56)  (1.78)*  (0.21)  (1.39) 
∆GDP per capita      0.441  0.282    0.347 
      (0.91)  (0.61)    (0.75) 
∆FDI rate        2.046    2.341 
        (2.10)**    (2.42)** 
∆Election          0.060  0.070 
          (3.35)***  (3.22)*** 
Observations  1201  1201  1120  1101  1201  1101 12 
 
 Table A.2: The effects of aid characteristics on the rhythm of disbursement in Africa (1975-2008).   
                           
Note: Z- Statistics absolute values are in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%. MG is the mean group 
Estimator and PMG is the pool mean group estimator of Pesaran and al (1999). 
 
Table A.3: Sensitivity analysis on the conditional convergence of disbursements (1975 – 2008). 
Note: Z- Statistics absolute values are in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  MG is the mean group 
estimator and PMG is the pool mean group estimator of Pesaran and al (1999). In the column 3 we run the model using only the sample of 









Dependant variable: first difference of ODA disbursements received from all donors 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Long run           
Commitments  1.046  1.089  0.828  0.818  0.957 
  (54.96)***  (43.57)***  (39.76)***  (42.65)***  (54.74)*** 
Grants share  2.014        1.508 
  (13.97)***        (10.92)*** 
LDCs selectivity    1.099      0.295 
    (3.33)***      (1.51) 
Aid fragmentation      0.900  -4.726  -3.435 
      (11.44)***  (5.75)***  (5.13)*** 
Aid fragmentation^2        1.096  0.771 
        (6.83)***  (5.84)*** 
           
Speed of adjustment  -0.569  -0.431  -0.555  -0.563  -0.579 
  (15.27)***  (15.92)***  (14.70)***  (13.76)***  (9.93)*** 
Short run           
∆commitment  -0.130  -0.057  -0.083  -0.091  -0.066 
  (3.17)***  (1.69)*  (2.33)**  (2.33)**  (0.76) 
∆Disbursement lag1  -0.024  -0.090  0.007  0.022  0.026 
  (0.64)  (3.02)***  (0.19)  (0.54)  (0.59) 
∆Commitment lag1  -0.043  -0.024  -0.055  -0.063  -0.090 
  (1.71)*  (1.01)  (2.00)**  (2.25)**  (2.52)** 
∆Grants share  -0.255        0.673 
  (1.95)*        (0.81) 
∆LDCs selectivity    -0.834      1.730 
    (2.87)***      (0.61) 
∆Aid fragmentation      0.007  0.027  -0.014 
      (0.08)  (0.36)  (0.13) 
Observations  1201  1201  1081  1081  1081 
Dependant variable: first difference of aid disbursements. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 














Long run                 
Commitment  1.062  1.055  1.156  0.965  1.120  0.882  0.920  1.030 
  (42.78)***  (61.27)***  (45.33)***  (35.36)***  (50.87)***  (33.64)***  (15.23)***  (34.17)*** 
                 
Adj. speed  -0.461  -0.521  -0.437  -0.557  -0.516  -0.646  -0.519  -0.562 
  (15.41)***  (16.88)***  (10.94)***  (12.23)***  (12.34)***  (14.21)***  (13.28)***  (8.55)*** 
Short run                 
∆Commitment  -0.073  -0.093  -0.083  -0.272  -0.060  -0.383  -0.310  -0.220 
  (2.25)**  (2.91)***  (1.98)**  (7.06)***  (1.10)  (10.67)***  (7.36)***  (3.65)*** 
∆Disbursement   -0.084  -0.051  -0.088  -0.071  -0.121  -0.057  -0.086  -0.024 
lag1  (2.69)***  (1.61)  (2.14)**  (2.16)**  (3.87)***  (1.56)  (1.29)  (0.45) 
                 
∆Commitment   -0.022  -0.032  -0.029  -0.205  0.004  -0.234  -0.183  -0.129 
lag1  (0.94)  (1.23)  (0.88)  (4.98)***  (0.12)  (8.97)***  (3.59)***  (2.81)*** 
Observations  1201  1228  814  1152  1118  1053  292  783 13 
 
Appendix B: Descriptive statistics and data 
 
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics  
 
Variables  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Programmable 
Disbursement 
1393  267.5642  443.2297  0.009  8939.23 
Programmable 
commitments 
1386  284.5285  586.8687  0.02  15431.13 
Global disbursement  1395  356.45  530.17  0.6  9975 
Global commitment  1395  371.9  665.6323  0.61  16605.51 
FDI (%GDP)  1286  2.25  8.05  -82.81  145.13 
GDP per capita  1279  701.23  908.63  56.52  7714.23 
ELECTION  1395  0.29  0.45  0  1 
Aid Fragmentation  1232  13.05  3.49  1  22 
Aid  selectivity  to 
LDCs 
1395  57.82  7.49  34.45  73.20 
Share  of  Grants  in 
commitments 
1395  68.98  19.65  14.59  100 
Note: commitment and disbursement are in million $US 
 
 
Table B.2: List of recipient countries 
1  Algeria*  11  Comoros  21  Ghana*  31  Mauritius*  41  Sudan 
2  Angola  12  Congo,  Dem. 
Rep. 
22  Guinea  32  Morocco*  42  Swaziland* 
3  Benin  13  Congo, Rep.*  23  Guinea-Bissau  33  Mozambique  43  Tanzania 
4  Botswana*  14  Cote d'Ivoire*  24  Kenya*  34  Niger  44  Togo 
5  Burkina Faso  15  Djibouti  25  Lesotho  35  Nigeria*  45  Tunisia* 
6  Burundi  16  Egypt,  Arab 
Rep.* 
26  Liberia  36  Rwanda  46  Uganda 
7  Cameroon*  17  Equatorial 
Guinea 
27  Madagascar  37  Sao  Tome  and 
Principe 
47  Zambia 
8  Cape Verde*  18  Ethiopia  28  Malawi  38  Senegal  48  Zimbabwe* 
9  Central 
African Rep. 
19  Gabon*  29  Mali  39  Sierra Leone       
10  Chad  20  Gambia, The  30  Mauritania  40  Somalia       
* Non Least Developped Country (LDCs).  
 
  